Labour migration in Russia grew substantially in 2022 compared to 2021 levels, yet this was just 85% of pre-pandemic levels. Despite the strength of the ruble, which has been a significant stimulus for the influx of migrant workers, the war and a shrinking economy appear to have slowed the recovery of migration inflows. This is likely to have exacerbated the strain on the Russian labour market in the second half of the year, against a backdrop of increased defence orders, mass workforce emigration, and mobilisation. Meanwhile, the Russian authorities have continued to apply a classic colonial approach towards labour migrants…<\/p>\n
..Perhaps this lack of labour migration would have been even more acute, if the ruble had not been as strong as it was this past year. Migrants are extremely sensitive to fluctuations in the ruble’s exchange rate; as it falls in value, the labour market becomes less appealing for them. When the war began, the ruble depreciated at a record-breaking rate. According to \u2018Memorial<\/a>\u2019, by early April 2022, 60,000 migrants had returned to Tajikistan and a further 133,000 to Uzbekistan. According to 40% of Uzbek returnees who reported to the Agency for External Labour Migration under the Uzbek Ministry of Employment and Labour Relations, the reasons for their return were unemployment and exchange rate volatility. However, by May, when, despite most expectations, the ruble had begun to grow stronger, the number of Tajiks coming to work in Russia outnumbered those returning home. In July, when the ruble had strengthened to a multi-year high, the intensity of labour immigration returned to pre-pandemic levels…<\/p>\n