{"id":37297,"date":"2025-11-11T12:08:04","date_gmt":"2025-11-11T09:08:04","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/adcmemorial.org\/?p=37297"},"modified":"2026-01-02T15:26:04","modified_gmt":"2026-01-02T12:26:04","slug":"illusory-unity","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/adcmemorial.org\/en\/articles\/columns\/illusory-unity\/","title":{"rendered":"Illusory Unity"},"content":{"rendered":"

Russia marked another Day of National Unity in a situation that journalist Olesya Gerasimenko described as<\/a> a \u201ccivil war in a cold phase\u201d: society is divided, opponents of the war have either been repressed or forced into exile, and those who remain in the country are being hunted by supporters of the war.<\/p>\n

The hunt is also open in the field of so-called \u201ctraditional values\u201d<\/em> \u2014 understood in practice as the triumph of patriarchy, obscurantism, and state violence against those who do not agree with such an interpretation. Let me recall that in Vladimir Putin\u2019s decree \u201cOn approval of the Fundamentals of State Policy for the Preservation and Strengthening of Traditional Russian Spiritual and Moral Values \u201d<\/em> (November 2022), seventeen such values are listed. For the most part, they are indisputable, and the words themselves are attractive: dignity, human rights and freedoms, high moral ideals, creative labour, mercy, justice, collectivism, mutual assistance and mutual respect \u2014 who would argue with that?<\/p>\n

Yet once the value of a \u201cstrong family\u201d<\/em> is proclaimed, goodbye to legislation against domestic violence, to women\u2019s reproductive rights, and, more broadly, to women\u2019s rights and the rights of LGBTQ+ people. Or take the value of \u201clife\u201d \u2014 taken away from hundreds of thousands of people since the start of the full-scale war against Ukraine, under the banner of the values of \u201cpatriotism, civic duty, service to the Motherland, and responsibility for its destiny.\u201d The value of \u201chistorical memory and continuity of generations\u201d<\/em> \u2014 in practice, the rewriting of history and militaristic propaganda in schools.<\/p>\n

The \u201cunity of the peoples of Russia\u201d<\/em> is also included in the list of \u201cvalues\u201d, yet it is far from clear what this actually means: equality? Inter-ethnic harmony and the absence of conflict? Russia\u2019s national policy oscillates between the construction of a \u201ccommon civic identity\u201d,<\/em> which increasingly tends towards Russification (the declaration of the Russian language as the language of the \u201cstate-forming people\u201d<\/em>, the reduction of teaching in non-Russian languages in schools, the attribution of a special role to Orthodoxy among other \u201ctraditional\u201d religions), and the need to take into account the country\u2019s multi-ethnic population. For this reason, the second component of strategic documents in the field of inter-ethnic relations has until now remained the \u201cpreservation and support of the ethno-cultural and linguistic diversity of the Russian Federation.\u201d<\/p>\n

However, even within this second component, a tendency towards Russification has become increasingly apparent. The latest version of the State Strategy on National Policy of the Russian Federation (for the period up to 2036) prescribes that no less than 80% of ethno-cultural events should be devoted to the promotion of Russian culture.<\/p>\n

This year, on 4 November, the Day of National Unity, a monument to Ivan the Terrible was solemnly unveiled in Vologda. The media quoted Governor Filimonov as saying:<\/p>\n

\u201cA multiplier of Russian lands. The Kazan Khanate, the Astrakhan Khanate. This is Orthodox missionary work. A symbol of the Russian world \u2014 a dynamic, at times harsh, in a good sense aggressive movement forward. A powerful bogatyr, an autocrat, a conqueror.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Monuments to this controversial tsar had previously been erected in Oryol and Cheboksary, despite protests by local residents, historians, the Council of Elders of the Chuvash National Congress, and representatives of the Tatar public. In 2019\u20132020, it was possible to fend off oligarch Konstantin Malofeev, who had been lobbying for the installation of a monument in Astrakhan. At the time, representatives of the Tatar Youth Forum wrote<\/a> in their appeal:<\/p>\n

\u201cFor the multi-million-strong Tatar people, Astrakhan is the most important centre of nation-building, the heart of its history and culture. At the same time, the figure of Ivan the Terrible has always been and will remain, for many peoples of our country, a sinister symbol of genocide, lawlessness, despotism, policies of confessional intolerance and violence.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

In 2025, it is precisely this figure that has become a symbol of \u201cnational unity\u201d.<\/em><\/p>\n

The formulation of specific \u201cvalues\u201d<\/em> for the purposes of policy in the sphere of inter-ethnic relations is not confined to Russia. Elsewhere, the results are no better \u2014 the gap between fine words and reality is simply too wide. For example, in Azerbaijan, a special \u201cAzerbaijani model of multiculturalism\u201d<\/em> is proclaimed as an everyday norm of citizens\u2019 lives \u2014 peaceful and neighbourly coexistence of peoples and religious denominations.\u00a0At the same time, a \u201cnational state ideology \u2014 Azerbaijani identity\u201d (azerbaijanism) is officially proclaimed, formulated as a set of civic values intended to serve as the basis for consolidating the country\u2019s multi-ethnic population (\u201ccitizenship,\u201d \u201cpatriotism,\u201d \u201cloyalty,\u201d \u201cresponsibility of citizens to society and the state\u201d). These ideas have been published as part of the special project \u201cAzerbaijani Multiculturalism\u201d<\/a> by the Presidential Library under the Administration of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan (since 2016).\u00a0Almost all of these ideas are fairly universal \u2014 acceptance of universal human values, patriotism as a strong attachment to one\u2019s country, the importance of tolerance and civic engagement, and so on. What, then, is specifically Azerbaijani here? Perhaps this:<\/p>\n

\u201cThe position of patriotism as borne by the ideology of Azerbaijani identity is a very important element in the process of state-building. From this perspective, the number one problem for Azerbaijan \u2014 and at the same time a common task and common goal of all our citizens, all Azerbaijanis worldwide, and one of the cornerstones of our national ideology \u2014 is the restoration of the country\u2019s territorial integrity, a just resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and the end of the occupation to which our country has been subjected. It is no coincidence that today all Azerbaijanis, regardless of political views or place of residence, express solidarity on the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The words of Ilham Aliyev, placed as the headline on the multiculturalism website \u2014 \u201cIn Azerbaijan, the most civilised norms of national and religious coexistence exist; there is a tolerant environment, and state-religious relations are perceived as exemplary worldwide\u201d \u2014 are far removed from reality. They are contradicted by the tragic mass exodus of the Armenian population from Nagorno-Karabakh, by cases of persecution of activists from ethnic minorities, by insufficient state support for minorities in education, and by their weak representation in state institutions.<\/p>\n

Another example of constructing a \u201cunified nation\u201d can be observed in Kazakhstan.<\/p>\n

Inter-ethnic tension in Kazakhstan was categorically denied during the rule of Nursultan Nazarbayev, who presented himself as the main guarantor of peaceful coexistence among the country\u2019s various ethnic groups. In the information space, the existence of problems of ethnic discrimination was virtually not acknowledged; in statements by representatives of the authorities, civil society, opposition figures, and in academic writings, Kazakhstan was portrayed as an idyllic \u201ccountry of united nations\u201d,<\/em> living in peace and friendship. Nazarbayev spoke of a special \u201cKazakhstani model of tolerance\u201d<\/em> and proposed extending it across the entire OSCE region.<\/p>\n

At the beginning of February 2020, Kazakhstan was shaken by a large-scale inter-ethnic conflict \u2014 pogroms of Dungan villages in the south of the country, resulting in deaths and destruction. These tragic events triggered public reflection on inter-ethnic relations, a topic that had previously received little attention. It became clear that the skills of peaceful coexistence among different ethnic groups \u2014 an undeniable legacy of Kazakhstan\u2019s ancient and modern history \u2014 require far more serious institutional support than the previous system had provided.<\/p>\n

Although the activities of the Assembly of the Peoples<\/span> of Kazakhstan<\/em> were reformed after 2020, Kazakhstan\u2019s policy in the sphere of inter-ethnic relations remains largely shaped by ideas and documents originating from the former president. These include Strategy-2050<\/em> (2012), which speaks of a New Kazakhstani Patriotism, and the \u201cdocumentary form of the nationwide idea\u201d \u2014 the Patriotic Act M\u00e4\u00f1gilik El <\/em>(literally, \u201cEternal Nation\u201d), adopted at the 24th session of the Assembly of the Peoples<\/span> of Kazakhstan in 2016. The latter document consists of a list of universal human values expressed through a brief set of symbolic phrases that, if one wishes, lend themselves to arbitrary and even contradictory interpretation.\u00a0Unsurprisingly, Kazakh nationalists perceived the New Kazakhstani Patriotism as legitimising preferences for the \u201ctitular nation,\u201d while representatives of ethnic minorities saw it as a threat of discrimination \u2014 despite the many correct words in these documents about equal opportunities, civic identity, and inter-ethnic harmony.<\/p>\n

Another concept fraught with conflict in the sphere of inter-ethnic relations, also introduced into the public domain by Nazarbayev, is that of ethnic Kazakhs as a \u201cstate-forming nation\u201d (speech at the 15th session of the Assembly of the Peoples<\/span> of Kazakhstan, 2009). Although the head of state spoke of the responsibility of Kazakhs as the \u201ccore\u201d and \u201csupport\u201d of the peoples<\/span> of Kazakhstan, it is easy to see here at least a division between \u201cKazakhs\u201d and \u201ceveryone else,\u201d and to interpret the notion of a \u201cspecial historical mission of the Kazakhs\u201d \u2014 applying some extrapolation \u2014 as legitimising ethnic superiority.<\/p>\n

These examples have much in common: attempts to describe, in words, the unique qualities of a particular people and to make this phantom part of state policy. At times it is the \u201ccivilisational code of Russian society,\u201d at others \u201cAzerbaijani identity as a system of values reflecting primary national-moral traits,\u201d or, as in Kazakhstan\u2019s Doctrine of National Unity, the \u201cSpirit of the Nation,\u201d which \u201crests on millennia-old traditions, values and culture, on language as part of a people\u2019s self-consciousness.\u201d<\/p>\n

I do not believe that the authors of these documents relied directly on the works of German thinkers and writers of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries \u2014 first and foremost Wilhelm von Humboldt \u2014 and their ideas about \u201cnational character\u201d and the \u201cspirit of the people.\u201d Most likely, they invented these concepts themselves, as best they could. Yet the very idea of inserting an ephemeral \u201ccode,\u201d \u201cspirit,\u201d or \u201cessence of the people\u201d into a strategic state document smacks of archaism and evokes grim associations. The notion of \u201cnational character\u201d was compromised by Nazi ideology and has long since been dismantled from a scholarly perspective.<\/p>\n

Indeed, the bearers of a given culture themselves rarely formulate, from within, the features of a \u201cnational spirit\u201d or, more accurately, their own identity and worldview. Instead, these are expressed through verbal folklore and other forms of traditional art, as well as through customary practices \u2014 economic, social, spiritual, and others. From the outside, it is scholars \u2014 ethnographers, ethno-linguists, anthropologists \u2014 who do this work: proceeding from empirical material and analysing cultural facts, they identify and describe the features that make a particular culture distinctive.<\/p>\n

Thus, for example, scholars study romanip\u00e9 (\u201cRomani-ness\u201d) \u2014 a complex set of ideas and practices that has enabled the Romani people to survive through centuries despite prejudice, persecution, discrimination, lack of statehood, dialectal fragmentation, or even language loss; or nochkhallo (\u201cChechen-ness\u201d) \u2014 a complex of elements of customary law, concepts of honour, family, and traditional etiquette; and other such \u201cspirits\u201d of other peoples, without ascribing to \u201cnational character\u201d or identity any sacred role or sacral meaning, and understanding that identity, customs, and culture in the broad sense are not static phenomena engraved forever on stone tablets, but adaptive and shaped by historical and other circumstances.<\/p>\n

When, however, the formulation of \u201cour traditions and values\u201d is carried out not by impartial scholars and not from the bottom up \u2014 from empirical material \u2014 but from the top down and imposed crudely, this so-called \u201cspirit\u201d becomes an instrument for suppressing rights and freedoms. For example, the Deputy Minister for Youth Affairs of the Chechen Republic and aide to Ramzan Kadyrov, Sugaipov, recently announced that Chechen women are obliged to wear a headscarf or at least a \u201cstrip\u201d on their heads, and threatened \u201cconversations\u201d with girls and their parents should they fail to comply.\u00a0He stated:<\/p>\n

\u201cWe will now promote the idea of wearing headscarves and cultural clothing that corresponds to the spirit of Chechen traditions\u2026 From the point of view of aesthetics, religion, Chechen adats, traditions and customs, a woman with her head covered looks much more dignified and beautiful\u2026 From our very roots, from our ancestors, it is clearly prescribed how a man and a woman should behave\u2026 We are doing this not for show, but for our people\u2026 And we will not allow anyone, under any pretext, to cross the line beyond which our values are lost. This is inviolable.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Here we have the full set: spirit, inviolability, and \u201cclearly prescribed\u201d \u2014 interestingly, where exactly? It is no coincidence that customs and traditions are often described as \u201cunwritten law.\u201d<\/p>\n

An obsession with the uniqueness of a particular culture or language, followed by the attribution to a people of a special \u201cnational character\u201d,<\/em> is not limited to the authors of strategies and politicians. There exists an entire field \u2014 linguoculturology \u2014 whose adherents claim a direct dependence of the \u201cspirit of a people\u201d<\/em> and \u201cethnic mentality\u201d<\/em> on the features of a particular language.<\/p>\n

Of course, each language segments reality differently; different features of objects attract the attention of speakers. In Russian, the hole of a needle is called an \u201cear,\u201d while in English it is an \u201ceye.\u201d Some languages of the Caucasus have dozens of grammatical cases, while many European languages have none at all. Chinese lacks the familiar grammatical category of tense; Bulgarian has four past tenses. What does this tell us? Only that these languages are structured in certain ways \u2014 nothing more.<\/p>\n

Widespread impersonal constructions in Russian does not indicate a refusal by Russian speakers to assume personal responsibility. The existence of a productive word-formation model that turns \u201cdairy products\u201d into mol\u00f3\u010dka, \u201cexpired products\u201d into prosr\u00f3chka, or abandoned buildings into zabr\u00f3shka does not make the suffix -k- diminutive, nor does it render the Russian language \u201cinfantilising\u201d or allow one to conclude that Russian speakers approach serious matters in an infantile way. In Russian, the auxiliary verb \u201cto be\u201d is used, while in English \u201cto have\u201d is also employed \u2014 but does this make Russian speakers philosophers inclined towards the search for the meaning of existence and \u201cAnglo-Saxons\u201d acquisitive by nature? Of course not.<\/p>\n

Nor does fixed word order, characteristic of many languages, testify to the clarity of thought, punctuality, or tidiness of their speakers, just as free word order does not make speakers of such languages careless.<\/p>\n

Arbitrary interpretations of linguistic phenomena and the attribution to peoples of certain traits of \u201cnational character\u201d,<\/em> which both amateurs and \u201cprofessionals\u201d \u2014 followers of neo-Humboldtian linguistics \u2014 are prone to, are far from harmless. They idealise representations of one\u2019s own people (such as the trope of the \u201cmysterious Russian soul\u201d<\/em>), foster ethnocentrism, and create and reinforce prejudices and stereotypes about other peoples. From there, it is only one step to ideas of national superiority \u2014 ideas that are profoundly destructive to inter-ethnic harmony.<\/p>\n

Let everyone do their own work: linguists, ethnologists, and anthropologists should study languages and cultures; \u201cspirit\u201d and \u201ccharacter,\u201d if they exist at all, should be expressed by poets, artists, and filmmakers. For the peaceful coexistence of people in society, no \u201cspirits\u201d are needed \u2014 what is needed is respect for the rule of law and human rights, and guarantees of non-violence and non-discrimination.<\/p>\n

Olga Abramenko, Expert, Anti-Discrimination Centre \u201cMemorial\u201d<\/em>
\nOriginally published on the blog of Radio Svoboda<\/a> (in Russian)<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Russia marked another Day of National Unity in a situation that journalist Olesya Gerasimenko described as a \u201ccivil war in a cold phase\u201d: society is divided, opponents of the war have either been repressed or forced into exile, and those…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":37300,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[362],"tags":[],"strategy_cases":[],"campaign":[],"archive":[],"filter-content":[],"regions":[584,443,515],"class_list":["post-37297","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-columns","regions-azerbaijan","regions-kazakhstan","regions-russia"],"acf":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"featured_image_urls_v2":{"full":["https:\/\/adcmemorial.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/unity1.png",922,576,false],"thumbnail":["https:\/\/adcmemorial.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/unity1-125x125.png",125,125,true],"medium":["https:\/\/adcmemorial.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/unity1-300x187.png",300,187,true],"medium_large":["https:\/\/adcmemorial.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/unity1-768x480.png",640,400,true],"large":["https:\/\/adcmemorial.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/unity1-650x406.png",640,400,true],"1536x1536":["https:\/\/adcmemorial.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/unity1.png",922,576,false],"2048x2048":["https:\/\/adcmemorial.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/unity1.png",922,576,false],"pub-thumb":["https:\/\/adcmemorial.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/unity1-220x137.png",220,137,true],"post-thumb":["https:\/\/adcmemorial.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/unity1-170x170.png",170,170,true],"wcicon":["https:\/\/adcmemorial.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/unity1-48x48.png",48,48,true],"wcsquare":["https:\/\/adcmemorial.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/unity1-300x300.png",300,300,true],"wcsmall":["https:\/\/adcmemorial.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/unity1-250x156.png",250,156,true],"wcstandard":["https:\/\/adcmemorial.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/unity1-550x344.png",550,344,true],"wcbig":["https:\/\/adcmemorial.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/unity1-800x500.png",800,500,true],"wcfixedheightsmall":["https:\/\/adcmemorial.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/unity1-288x180.png",288,180,true],"wcfixedheightmedium":["https:\/\/adcmemorial.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/unity1-480x300.png",480,300,true],"wcfixedheight":["https:\/\/adcmemorial.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/unity1-800x500.png",800,500,true],"wccarouselsmall":["https:\/\/adcmemorial.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/unity1-210x150.png",210,150,true],"wccarousel":["https:\/\/adcmemorial.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/unity1-400x285.png",400,285,true],"wcslider":["https:\/\/adcmemorial.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/unity1-922x500.png",922,500,true]},"post_excerpt_stackable_v2":"

Russia marked another Day of National Unity in a situation that journalist Olesya Gerasimenko described as a \u201ccivil war in a cold phase\u201d: society is divided, opponents of the war have either been repressed or forced into exile, and those who remain in the country are being hunted by supporters of the war. The hunt is also open in the field of so-called \u201ctraditional values\u201d \u2014 understood in practice as the triumph of patriarchy, obscurantism, and state violence against those who do not agree with such an interpretation. Let me recall that in Vladimir Putin\u2019s decree \u201cOn approval of the…<\/p>\n","category_list_v2":"Columns<\/a>","author_info_v2":{"name":"admin3","url":"https:\/\/adcmemorial.org\/en\/author\/admin3\/"},"comments_num_v2":"0 comments","amp_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/adcmemorial.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/37297","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/adcmemorial.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/adcmemorial.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/adcmemorial.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/adcmemorial.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=37297"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/adcmemorial.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/37297\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":37303,"href":"https:\/\/adcmemorial.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/37297\/revisions\/37303"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/adcmemorial.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/37300"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/adcmemorial.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=37297"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/adcmemorial.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=37297"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/adcmemorial.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=37297"},{"taxonomy":"strategy_cases","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/adcmemorial.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/strategy_cases?post=37297"},{"taxonomy":"campaign","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/adcmemorial.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/campaign?post=37297"},{"taxonomy":"archive","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/adcmemorial.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/archive?post=37297"},{"taxonomy":"filter-content","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/adcmemorial.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/filter-content?post=37297"},{"taxonomy":"regions","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/adcmemorial.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/regions?post=37297"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}