A Russian–Azerbaijani scandal is in full scale, sparked by the brutal detention and torture of ethnic Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg, which resulted in the deaths of two of them and severe beatings of others. Random Russian citizens, harshly detained in Azerbaijan, were also beaten; the Azerbaijani authorities responded “symmetrically” to Russian lawlessness and violence by deliberately engaging in public lawlessness and violence of their own.
Experts and journalists have already published several reviews of how Russian–Azerbaijani relations have developed over the past decades: recalling the tragedy of the downed plane, the fact that such cases of police abuse against Azerbaijanis – both migrants and Russian citizens – have been frequent in Russia, and the Azerbaijani element of Russian organized crime. One of the main questions now being discussed is why Russia chose to insult Azerbaijan in such public way at this particular moment – and why Azerbaijan responded so sharply and in such an equally appalling way. Experts point to global geopolitical reasons for the current escalation (the Azerbaijan–Turkey alliance has strengthened, there has been progress in resolving the conflict with Armenia, while Russia is losing its position in the South Caucasus and trying to regain it).
I recall several episodes involving Azerbaijanis from my past human rights work.
2011, the village of Sagra – 40 km from Yekaterinburg. A household dispute between neighbors, the police refuse to come, and one of the disputants (an ethnic Romani man) calls for help from a criminal leader. An armed group arrived to the village, it consisted of guys of different origin, but the media persistently call them an “Azerbaijani gang.” Locals arm themselves with a double-barreled shotgun; in the shootout, one attacker – an ethnic Azerbaijani – is killed, and the gang retreats. A nationalist campaign begins: Yekaterinburg is plastered with stickers reading “I’ll marry a Sagra man,” T-shirts saying “Sagra, we’re with you” appear, politicians call on “native residents” to arm themselves against “ethnic occupiers,” the internet is full of music videos glorifying the Sagra locals and extremist calls to “sort out the intruders.” Azerbaijani-owned businesses are subjected to strict inspections and closures. High officers in the local police were dismissed; the newly appointed investigators determine that the “Gypsy drug business” and “Azerbaijani mafia” in Sagra were fake, and the real cause of the conflict was personal enmity.
Also in the 2010s, I remember my surprise when in a regular state school I found an “Azerbaijani floor” – as opposed to the “Orthodox floor” (this was the wording used by the teachers). Segregation in schools was nothing new to us – we had already seen widely spread “Gypsy classes” and “Gypsy schools” in places of living of large Romani communities – but segregation of Azerbaijani children was happening in the very center of St. Petersburg.
2015, St. Petersburg: a criminal incident occurs involving two Azerbaijanis. Governor Poltavchenko calls the head of the Azerbaijani National-Cultural Autonomy, Mamishev. As the governor’s advisor on national issues, Mamishev gathers all the leaders of St. Petersburg’s “diaspora” national organizations and proposes de facto collective responsibility: “We will make a list of cafés, restaurants, and markets run by our people. And if a crime happens there, the owners will be held responsible for not reporting what was happening on their premises.”
2024: MP Pyotr Tolstoy calls for an end to “interethnic liberalism” and equates national diasporas, hometown associations, and communities with “legalized mafia structures” with their own laws and customs parallel to Russian ones.
These episodes add up to a fairly characteristic picture of ethnic minority life in Russia. On the one hand, there are some opportunities to develop national life (for example, the law on national–cultural autonomies). On the other hand, there is criminalization of defending the rights of Indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities – and of the entire agenda of regionalism, federalism, self-determination, and identity; discrimination (school segregation of children being the most obvious example); application of collective responsibility; vulnerability to far-right extremist groups supported by high-ranking Russian officials; and accusations of creating “mafia structures” and “parallel laws.”
The idea of equal laws and equality before the law was voiced by Russian propagandists in response to the escalation of the Russian–Azerbaijani conflict. For example, Mardan, a colleague of the odious Solovyov, said that Russia is within its rights – the detained Azerbaijanis are Russian citizens, and everyone is equal before the law regardless of origin or of the fact when/how they got their Russian passport – so what does Azerbaijan have to do with this, and why is it interfering? (As if torture and brutal detention of anyone at all could ever be acceptable.)
If this talk of equality before the law was pure hypocrisy from the propagandists’ side, sometimes local authorities try to use this argument to restrain xenophobic aggression. In reports from so called “people’s gatherings” (this is the name of people’s meetings as a reaction to some sensitive events) in regions where incidents or even mass riots involving ethnic minorities occur, you can see how local leaders try to explain to the crowd that crimes, accidents, and other incidents must be investigated regardless of the ethnicity of those involved. But the public doesn’t agree: household disputes between neighbors, reactions to traffic accidents, and especially criminal incidents where someone is seriously injured or killed very easily and quickly turn into pogroms and mass riots. This shows that the level of hatred and xenophobia in Russian society is very high. The examples are both outdated (Sagra, with the Azerbaijanis) and recent (Chemodanovka, Korkino, and now the Saratov region – where the ethnic majority is demanding the expulsion of the Romani minority – who, of course, are Russian citizens).
Russia’s state national policy, developed and implemented under the leadership of the FADN (Federal Agency for Ethnic Affairs), declares two components: strengthening the civic nation of “Rossiyane = citizens of Russia” and supporting the cultures of Russia’s peoples. It has often been noted that the first component greatly outweighs the second one, and in practice results in Russification and disregard for the rights of ethnic minorities. Now the FADN has published a draft of an updated “State National Policy Strategy until 2036,” in which these tendencies are preserved and strengthened. The head of the FADN, Igor Barinov, went so far as to repeat a blatantly fascist slogan I remember from Zhirinovsky’s election campaign: “When things are good for Russians, it’s good for everyone.”
Discrimination against minorities and the infringement of their rights is a source of tension – and it is in the interests of the state and the entire population to defuse that tension. Letting the genie of aggressive nationalism out of the bottle is easy; putting it back is far harder. Bad for minorities– bad for everyone.
Olga Abramenko, expert of ADC Memorial
First published on the blog of Radio Svoboda (in Russian)