26 September marks European Day of Languages. In many countries, not only in Europe, various events are held to promote and support linguistic diversity: quizzes and competitions, introductory lessons in different languages, mock tests, theatre performances, round tables, and so on. These events are organised by schools, language associations, cultural institutions (such as the Goethe-Institut, the British Council, the French Institute, among others).
It was decided to celebrate the European Day of Languages annually from 2002 onwards, following the declaration of 2001 as the European Year of Languages. In its decision to establish an annual celebration of linguistic diversity, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe set out important principles: “Learning the languages of other peoples is a way to help us understand each other better and overcome our cultural differences”; “Language skills are a fundamental right for EVERYONE – this is one of the key messages of the European Day of Languages”. The stated goals of the Day of Languages are to raise awareness “of the rich linguistic diversity of Europe, which must be preserved and strengthened”; “of the need to diversify the range of languages that people learn (including less widely used languages), which will lead to multilingualism”; “the need to develop a certain degree of proficiency in two or more languages in order to be able to play a full role in democratic citizenship in Europe”. At the same time, within this concept, the languages spoken by the inhabitants of contemporary Europe, including migrants, are also meant as “European”.
If we compare the above-mentioned European principles – the priority of bilingualism and multilingualism, the need for diversity in the languages studied and attention to the study of less widely spoken languages – with the principles contained in Russian strategic documents and legislation in the field of language policy, we can see a significant difference, precisely in the approach to bilingualism and multilingualism.
Of course, such documents as the Concept of Language Policy of the Russian Federation (2024) and the Fundamentals of Language Policy of the Russian Federation (2025) talk a lot about the “support and development” of the languages of the peoples of Russia – both those having the status of state languages in the regions and the languages of “non-titular” and small peoples – and about the equality of languages. However, firstly, the main and predominant part of the language policies is support for the Russian state language in its dominant role and its global expansion. In these documents, the Russian people are directly referred to as the state-forming people, and the Russian language is referred to as the determining factor of “all-Russian civic identity”. (It is remarkable that Putin recently instructed the establishment of a Day of the Languages of the Peoples of Russia, to be celebrated on 8 September, the birthday of the Soviet poet Rasul Gamzatov, emphasising that Gamzatov wrote in Avar but gained fame thanks to translations into Russian.) Secondly, when it comes to bilingualism and multilingualism, this is assumed for all peoples except the Russians, while knowledge of Russian is imposed as a duty to all.
There is a visible shift even within a single year. The Concept (2024) lists among its language policy objectives the the following: provision of free choice of education in the native language; according to parents’ requests – the establishment of kindergarten groups with instruction in the native language and support for the teaching of native languages in schools; development of schools implementing programmes in the native language (all this refers to languages other than Russian, the state language). But in the Fundamentals (2025) these points are not mentioned. If we compare the “Expected Results” section of both documents, the Concept (2024) mentions the formation of an educational and methodological base for teaching native languages in the general education system, the creation of conditions for learning native languages and opportunities for teaching in native languages, and ensuring opportunities for the use of the languages of the peoples of the Russian Federation in education and culture. In the Fundamentals (2025), the languages of the peoples of the Russian Federation are mentioned alongside Russian: “improvements to the educational and methodological base for teaching Russian and other languages of the peoples of the Russian Federation” are expected, as well as “the systematisation of information about the languages of the peoples of the Russian Federation and their inclusion in the state register of the peoples of the Russian Federation” and “improvements to the norms of the state language of the Russian Federation, the state languages of the republics of the Russian Federation and other languages of the Russian Federation”.
To prevent the interpretation of “native language” as “any language other than Russian,” the Fundamentals of Language Policy specifically (and rather awkwardly) clarifies:
“the native language (native languages) is considered to be one or more languages from among the languages of the peoples of the Russian Federation, which includes Russian, the state language of the Russian Federation, as well as another language (other languages) learned by a citizen at an early age due to living in a specific linguistic environment, the language of the ethnic group to which the citizen belongs.”
The 2018 amendments to the Law on Education further undermined bilingualism in the school system: in order to study their native language, parents must now submit a written application and choose the precise language. The 2018 amendments were adopted despite protests in the RF regions and led to the fact that Tatar language teachers in Tatarstan, for example, were forced to resign or retrain to teach other subjects.
It is obvious that in a situation where Russian prevails at all levels of the education system, parents often choose Russian but not their native language in an effort to better prepare their children for higher education and/or because they consider their native language to be less prestigious and with fewer prospects overall, and sometimes they refuse to study their native language under pressure. On the other hand, Russian-speaking parents who would like their children to learn the language of the region where they live (Tatar, for instance) must formally declare this language as their “native” language, even though it is not their children’s native language really. To overcome this contradiction, regions have to struggle; for example, in 2022, Tatarstan introduced the subject “Tatar as the state language” (also on a voluntary basis).
The federal government continues to make decisions on language policy that are painfully perceived in the regions. For example, on 1 September 2025, an order by the Minister of Education came into force to reduce the number of hours allocated to the teaching of “native” languages (from 2 to 1 hour per week in Russian-speaking schools, from 3 to 2 in schools with non-Russian languages of instruction), as well as renaming the subject “native language” to “language of the people of the Russian Federation.” The ministry explained that the reduction was done due to concern for children’s health – to avoid excessive workload – and proposed moving native language lessons to “extracurricular activities.”
The position of the Russian authorities on language issues was recently heard in Geneva, where the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights considered the Russian Federation’s state report on compliance with the Covenant of the same name (on economic, social and cultural rights). The Committee’s experts had to ask the same questions several times, as they were not satisfied with the Russian delegation’s answers. The discussion concerned the occupied territories of Ukraine, where the Ukrainian language – one of the most widely spoken in Europe – has been removed from schools, access to online education in Ukrainian educational institutions has been blocked, school curricula have been subject to militarisation, and Ukrainian cultural heritage has been destroyed (these facts were reported to the Committee by representatives of civil society in their alternative reports). In response, the representative of the Russian Ministry of Education repeated that the “reunited territories” (i.e. the occupied territories) are part of the Russian Federation, that the language of instruction in the Russian Federation is Russian, and that Ukrainian can be studied as an extracurricular activity or online – just connect with the internet and study. Needless to say, those who try to preserve Ukrainian identity in the occupied territories face risks amid the aggressive imposition of an “all-Russian civic identity” that is which in practice is indistinguishable from Russification.
Concerns about Russification and the loss of bilingualism in favour of Russian are also voiced in the regions of the Russian Federation, and there have even been reactions to the tightening of language policy in the regional documents. In 2018 – back before the war – Buryatia adopted a Strategy for the Development of the Buryat Language until 2030, which placed particular emphasis on working with families and parents: in the context of the imposition of the Russian language and the requirement to submit a written request to study their native Buryat language, it is important to remind them of the value of their native language.
In republics where bilingualism still exists, there is a significant imbalance: for example, in the Republic of Bashkortostan, the already high level of Russian language proficiency among Tatars (98.4%) and Bashkirs (96.4%) – according to 2010 data – continues to grow, reaching absolute levels. However, the reverse bilingualism, i.e. proficiency among Russians in Tatar and Bashkir, remains extremely low: according to maximum estimates, about 5% of Russians in Bashkortostan had some degree of proficiency in these languages at the beginning of the 21st century; the introduction of obligatory studying native languages in secondary schools for a certain period proved to be ineffective. As a sociologist writes in is article (2019), “with the significant growth of one wing of bilingualism, the other is hardly developing at all, which threatens to cause the Russian eagle to fall down.”
Olga ABRAMENKO
First published on the blog of Radio Svoboda (in Russian)