Feedback In Russia, 41 regions have now introduced a maternity allowance of around 100,000 rubles (approximately €1,070) for pregnant schoolgirls. Previously, this benefit was only available to university students. Officially, the money is intended to support girls in difficult life circumstances — not to encourage pregnancy.
Nina Ostanina, a government official responsible for family affairs, child welfare, and public safety in the Duma, has spoken out against promoting parenthood among school-aged girls. However, in practice, such financial support inevitably acts as an incentive for teenage pregnancies. Her colleague, Olga Pilipenko, who oversees education policy, believes the payments could encourage young women to choose childbirth over abortion. But realistically, a one-time payment of 100,000 rubles is far from enough to cover the short- or long-term costs of motherhood.
For families living in poverty, however, this amount can be a powerful incentive — not just for the young girls themselves, but also for their families. Early pregnancies, teenage marriages, and childbirth before the age of 18 are already widespread in some communities. Experts at ADC Memorial, for example, report that in closely-knit Roma communities, people often become grandparents by the age of 26–28 and great-grandparents by 40–45. This is not an exception — it is reality in many places.
This situation is the result of deep-rooted structural discrimination. Roma communities have historically been unable to escape limited access to education, high unemployment, poverty, and poor living conditions. But the state also plays a role — through neglect and a lack of targeted support for these communities.
There are well-established ways to prevent early marriage. Children who attend school regularly are less likely to marry or become parents at a young age. Later marriages tend to correlate with a positive school experience — consistent attendance, parental involvement, and integration into mainstream classes rather than being placed in so-called “Gypsy classes.”
Rather than tackling these systemic issues in a meaningful and sustainable way, the Russian state often opts for the easier route: either ignoring the problem altogether or reacting only when public outrage arises. When cases of early marriage or underage childbirth come to light, the authorities often respond by prosecuting the minors for allegedly “seducing” adults or punishing the parents for encouraging the behavior.
A recent case of child marriage in a Roma community in Astrakhan drew national attention. In response, Ostanina called for the parents of the underage couple to be prosecuted. Yet early marriage and pregnancy are neither rare nor confined to Roma communities — especially in patriarchal environments.
Moreover, most Roma girls are unlikely to receive the 100,000-ruble maternity benefit at all. Their pregnancies often begin before they turn 18 — typically after dropping out of school or remaining formally enrolled without any real attendance or participation. For those who do attend school, a new subject called Family Studies has been introduced — part of a broader political campaign aimed at increasing the birth rate. The reasoning behind the course is framed in nationalist and demographic terms. At the official textbook launch, Ostanina explained:
“We used a term provided by professional demographers. They say that a special demographic operation is necessary to preserve our national sovereignty.” She added that this “special operation” would not take place on the battlefield but in society — by protecting and reinforcing traditional values. These values, she said, must be maintained not just in families but also in schools and public life. That, she argued, is why Family Studies was created.
Professional demographers, however, warn that simply “rejuvenating” the birth rate — that is, encouraging younger women to give birth — does not lead to any long-term increase in fertility. They point out that support for school-age mothers, though often cited in political discourse, is rare and mostly symbolic. Such cases are typically treated as emergencies, not as standard policy. “This has nothing to do with demography,” says demographer Alexey Raksha. “It’s just a complete discrediting of pronatalism — and of basic common sense.”
But can we even speak of common sense when the state’s apparent goal is to push women into motherhood?
Some officials have gone so far as to suggest that women should wear mini-skirts to attract male attention. Others have proposed discouraging girls from pursuing higher education — or even abolishing abortion rights in certain regions. At the same time, regional governments are attempting to lure women of childbearing age into specific areas to boost local birth statistics.
Financial incentives are also offered to dissuade women from having abortions — only for the state to later remove their children and raise them in state institutions. There is no evidence that any of these strategies result in a real increase in birth rates.
Whether soft or coercive, all of these approaches share a single goal: to reduce women to one role — that of housewife and mother — with little regard for their autonomy, aspirations, or rights.
One might expect that in times of war, economic crisis, and labor shortages, Russia would finally abolish the outdated list of professions banned for women — as many other post-Soviet states have already done, including conservative countries like Uzbekistan. But Russia has chosen a different path: the list is being reduced only gradually and partially.
In December 2022, a draft law was introduced in the State Duma aimed at repealing Article 253 of the Labor Code — the legal foundation for occupational discrimination against women. This would have granted women access to higher-paying jobs and helped improve their pensions. But the proposal was ultimately rejected. The justification? The same logic used to defend most pronatalist policies: women must be protected for the sake of their fertility. The Duma’s Committee on Family, Women, and Children stated that removing employment restrictions for women would be “inappropriate,” arguing:
“Allowing women to engage in hard or hazardous labor would negatively affect their reproductive health and reduce their level of social protection — which, in turn, would harm the demographic situation of our country.”
As a result, women continue to be denied professional freedom — all under the guise of protecting their reproductive health — reinforcing the idea that their primary role is to bear children, not to participate in the economy.
And once again, everything is framed in terms of the “demographic situation” — a phrase repeated so often that it has lost all explanatory power.
That situation, by the way, is shaped not just by birth rates — which are poorly supported and heavily influenced by broader socioeconomic conditions — but also by death rates. And those are rising dramatically. Hundreds of thousands of men have been killed or permanently disabled by Russia’s war against Ukraine. Other contributing factors include rising alcohol consumption, a crumbling healthcare system, economic instability, and declining life expectancy.
Yet the government refuses to confront these underlying problems or reckon with the devastating human cost of war. Instead, it places the burden of the country’s demographic future squarely on women — waging a so-called “special operation” not on the battlefield, but against their autonomy, their free will, and their reproductive rights.
Olga Abramenko, expert of ADC Memorial
First published on the blog of Radio Svoboda (in Russian)